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I.  PRE-PRODUCTION—INTRODUCTION 
The magic phrase “now known or later developed” is the caveat and bedrock 
of the Copyright Act1, and is found in its first two provisions.2  These words are 
intended to ensure that new technology is a part of the Copyright Act.3  Despite 
these five magic words, we have let technology get away from us, and the law is 
impeding our improvement.4 
The Copyright Act was last amended in 1999 to comport with the advent of 
new technologies.5  However, the 1999 amendments may be catering to the 
entertainment industry and its lobbyists.6  Individual consumers cannot afford to 
lobby, and these individual consumers create our social norms.  Our social norm 
is non-compliance with the infringement provisions of the Copyright Act, and in 
particular, illegal downloading. 
Historically, copyright has been protected for the benefit of the public.7  
Currently the predominant view in the courts places the author or rights holders’ 
interests above society’s interests.8  The issue is whether this view violates the 
historical policy behind the Copyright Act. 
                                                                                                                                     
1 The definitions section of the Copyright Act states, 
‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work 
is fixed by any method now known or later developed . . . .  A ‘device’, 
‘machine’, or ‘process’ is one now known or later developed . . . .  
‘Phonorecords are material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by 
any method now known or later developed . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  The next reference to the phrase is in the provision on copyrightable 
subject matter, “A copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed . . . .”  Id. 
§ 102(a). 
2 Id. §§ 101, 102(a). 
3 General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, (amending title 17 of 
the United States Code in its entirety), enacted October 19, 1976; see ALFRED C. YEN & JOSEPH P. 
LIU, COPYRIGHT LAW: ESSENTIAL CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (Thompson West 2008). 
4 See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 9. 
5 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006); see generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (2006). 
6 See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12. 
7 One economic philosophy behind the Copyright Act is to encourage individual effort by 
rewarding authors for their creation, thus incentive is produced for the good of society.  
Historically, it is in the public’s best interest to distribute works as widely as possible.  See Mazer 
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Nash v. CBS Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990). 
8 See New York Times v. Tasini, 184 F. Supp. 2d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (interpreted the 
Copyright Act so that authors should unquestionably gain all protection unless it is clearly stated 
in the Copyright Act that they should not). 
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The invention of new technology has consistently had an effect on the law of 
copyrights.9  The advent of the Internet and its effect on copyright has been 
argued in case law on many issues, from the posting of poetry to the streaming of 
pirated videos.  The focus of this article is the dilemma of peer-to-peer file 
sharing websites and the availability of a cause of action for infringement of 
copyrighted sound recordings. 
The war to hinder the damage done to the recording industry has taken many 
paths.10  Beginning with the attack on websites and Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) themselves, precedent has been set in the secondary infringement area of 
law.11 
A new battle is being waged, not against the corporations which have reaped 
financial benefits by enticing its user-base with free music downloads,12 but 
against the individual non-commercial users.13  These users are being held liable 
for millions of dollars in statutory copyright damages.14  This leads to the 
                                                                                                                                     
9 See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12.  Congress has amended the Copyright Act more than 
twenty times since 1976.  Id.  This has been in reaction to specific problems that arise as 
technology advances.  See, e.g., Burrow Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–60 
(1884); see also, Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int’l, 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982). 
10 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios became 
precedent on the issue of contributory infringement in the peer-to-peer file sharing cases.  464 U.S. 
417 (1986).  In Sony, the invention of Sony’s video cassette recorder did not subject Sony to 
secondary copyright liability because it was capable of substantial non-infringing uses.  464 U.S. 
at 456.  Other cases involving the issue of secondary liability for copyright infringement were 
filed, and rules regarding peer-to-peer file sharing networks and copyright infringement were 
forged.  E.g., A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
Napster did receive financial benefit from the infringement, had the right and ability to supervise 
the infringing activity, and therefore A&M Records had demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
the merits on the claim of vicarious infringement); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 
545 U.S. 913, 939–40 (2005) (Grokster found liable because it induced its users to infringe).  
Damages in these cases have been difficult to assess.  These consequences of secondary copyright 
infringement by peer-to-peer file sharing have been varied and include a drop in CD prices to the 
extinction of many independent music stores.  Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, 
Plunge Sharply: Rise in Downloading Fails to Boost Industry; A Retailing Shakeout, WALL ST. J., 
MAR. 21, 2007, at A1.  The MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) reported in 2005 that 
American studios lost $2.3 billion due to Internet piracy.  Press Release, Motion Picture 
Association of America, Swedish Authorities Sink Pirate Bay, Huge Worldwide Supplier of 
Illegal Movies Told No Safe Harbors for Facilitators of Piracy! (May 31, 2006) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.mpaa.org/press_releases/2006_05_31.pdf. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005).  In 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, copyright holders sued a peer-to-peer file sharing company for 
copyright infringement.  Id. 
13 See Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 (D. Minn. 2008). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
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question of this digital age:  whether the amount of an award against a non-
commercial user of a peer-to-peer network for infringement can be so excessive 






 the copyright holder for a certain 
amo
o need to prove actual damages before electing an 
awa 21
                                                                                                                                    
II.  SOUND SOURCE SELECTION
 Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act 
The owner of a copyright is entitled to certain rights with respect to certain 
artistic works.16  The rights holder has the right to exclude any other person from 
reproducing the work, preparing derivative works, distributing the work, 
performing the work, displaying the work or using the work covered by copyright 
for a specific period of time.17  When another violates one of these rights, he has 
infringed the copyrighted work and is liable to
unt in damages; either actual or statutory. 
To prevail in a copyright infringement action under the Copyright Act, a 
plaintiff must show (1) ownership of a valid copyright,18 and (2) unauthorized 
copying or distribution of the copyrighted work.19  If copyright infringement is 
found, the copyright owner may elect, instead of actual damages, statutory 
damages, in a sum ranging from a minimum of $750 to a maximum of $30,000 
for any one work.20  There is n
rd of statutory damages.  
If the copyright owner proves the infringement was willful, the court may 
increase the award per work up to and including a maximum of $150,000.22  If the 
 
15 See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227:  
[T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the 
damages suffered by Plaintiffs.  Thomas allegedly infringed on the 
copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of approximately three CDs, 
costing less than $54, and yet the total damages awarded is $222,00-
more than five hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and 
more than four thousand times the cost of three CDs. 
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2006). 
17 Id. § 102(a). 
18 Id. § 412. 
19 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“To establish 
infringement two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original.”); 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
21 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 229 (1952).  As long as the 
damages award is within the limitations proscribed by the statute, “the court’s discretion and sense 
of justice are controlling.”  Id. at 232. 
22 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
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infringer proves that he was unaware he was infringing, the court may reduce the 
award to a minimum of $200 for any one work.23  If the infringer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that his use of the work was fair use,24 the court may remit the 
stat 25
rier of fact 
con 29
                                                                                                                                    
utory damage award.  
In addition to assuring adequate compensation for the copyright holder, the 
statute’s intent is to punish and deter.26  The damages section of the Copyright 
Act was amended in 1999 to increase the amount of statutory damages in 
response to digital theft by users of the Internet.27  When the defendant requests a 
jury trial, the jury decides what the defendant will pay within the wide range of 
damages.28  To determine the amount of statutory damages the t
siders the harm to the plaintiffs and deterrence of the defendant.  
The election of statutory damages can be made at any time before final 
judgment is rendered.30  The choice to recover statutory damages precludes a 
recovery of both the plaintiff’s actual damages and the defendant’s profits.31  
Many plaintiffs choose statutory damages over actual damages because it is 
difficult to quantify their actual damages, or the defendant’s profits.32  There are 
many factors in the computation of actual damages such as injury to the market 
value of the copyrighted work, imputed license fees and interest.33  Each of these 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. § 107.  Fair use of a copyrighted work is an affirmative defense where violation of one 
of the exclusive rights is allowed when the work is used for “purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research [and] is not an infringement of copyright.”  
Id. 
25 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
26 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 103 (Comm. Print 1961), 
reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman Ed., 
1976). 
27 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 
106-160, 113 Stat. 1774, (1999) (amending chapter 5 of title 17 of the United States Code to 
increase statutory damages for copyright infringement).  The remedy for statutory damages dates 
back to the 1710 Statute of Anne in England.  Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).  In 1790, 
the United States promulgated the Copyright Act which included a statutory damages provision.  
Copyright Act of 1790 § 1.  Although the Copyright Act has been amended several times, each 
time the statutory damages provision has been preserved.  See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12. 
28 Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The law 
commits to the trier of facts, within the named limits, discretion to apply the measure furnished by 
the statute.”). 
29 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 14.04[B] (2009). 
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requires the assessment of lost revenue, indirect damage, business trends and 
punitive damages.34  The courts do their best to make a fair appraisal of the 
work’s damages, but many plaintiffs find it easier to opt for the statutory award.35 
B. 
 .”36  The Constitution protects a person’s liberty under the 
Due 37
ive it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
United Sta 41 
defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm actually suffered and the 
                                                                                                                                    
Constitutional Protection Under the Due Process Clause 
Copyright protection stems from the Constitution.  Article one, Section eight, 
Clause eight was drafted “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right of their 
respective Writings . . .
 Process Clause.  
1. Due Process Protection: Punitive Damages 
When damages are awarded based on the defendant’s conduct, and not on the 
plaintiff’s actual harm, the intent is to punish and deter blameworthy conduct.38  
These are punitive damages.39  When punitive damages are found to be grossly 
excessive compared to compensatory, or actual damages, they can be considered 
offensive to our sense of justice and therefore, unconstitutional.40  If a punitive 
damages award is so far above the actual damages, or harm suffered, and the court 
determines it is grossly excess
 tes Constitution.
a. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 
Gore addressed excessive punitive damages and suggested a maximum 
constitutional limit.42  The Supreme Court found the punitive damages award, 
which was five hundred times the compensatory damages, to be “grossly 
excessive,” and the Court promulgated a three-part test to determine the result. 43  




36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37 “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
38 Punitive damages are defined as “[awards] in addition to actual damages when the 
defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit” and specifically, “damages assessed by way 
of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 418 
(8th ed. 2004). 
39 Id. 
40 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
41 Id. at 568. 
42 Id. at 559–61. 
43 Id. at 560. 
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punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the remedy in the 
specific case and the remedies imposed in comparable cases.44 
b. Philip Morris USA v. Williams 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams45 is another example of the Supreme Court’s 
constraint on punitive damages.46  This case involved a negligence and deceit 
lawsuit brought by Williams’ estate against Phillip Morris, a cigarette 
manufacturer.47  The jury found an award of compensatory damages in the 
amount of $821,000 and $79.5 million in punitive damages.48  The issue before 
the Supreme Court was whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause permits a 
jury to base a punitive damages award in part to punish the defendant for harm to 
those who are not presently victims before the court.49  The Court held that these 
awards would be a “taking of ‘property’ from the defendant without due 
process.”50 
c. Punitive Damages Have Propensity for Unconstitutionality  
The rule on punitive damages seems settled.  In light of Gore and Williams, 
guidelines have been developed for punitive damages.51  Synthesizing the rules 
from these cases leads to the conclusion that these damages should be constrained 
for the sake of fairness and justice.52  Gore and Williams discuss the relationship 
of actual damages to punitive damages at length.  However, neither of them 
specifically addressed statutory damages. 
                                                                                                                                     
44 Id. at 574–75. 
45 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
46 Id. at 346–47. 
47 Id. at 349.  The plaintiff, Jesse Williams was a heavy cigarette smoker, and smoked a brand 
of cigarette that Phillip Morris manufactured.  Id.  Because Williams’ death was caused by 
smoking, the jury found that both Williams and Phillip Morris were negligent and deceitful 
because Phillip Morris led Williams to believe that smoking was safe.  Id. at 350. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 349. 
50 Id. 
51 See BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 560 (1996) (noting that the award was 
grossly excessive based on three guidelines); Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that there are 
procedures for evaluating punitive damages and amounts deemed as grossly excessive). 
52 See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (stating that notions of fairness in “constitutional jurisprudence 
dictate that a person receive fair notice” of a certain conduct’s punishment and the “severity of the 
penalty that the State may impose”); Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that the Due Process 
Clause forbids the use of punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries caused to strangers 
to the suit). 
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2. Due Process Protection & the Copyright Statutory Damages Regime 
Copyright statutory damages are similar to punitive damages in that the 
copyright statutory damages regime is based on deterrence of the defendant’s 
conduct, not on the plaintiff’s harm.53  Whether statutory damages can be 
considered excessive and violate the Due Process Clause, comparable to 
excessive punitive damages, is up for debate.54   
a. Zomba Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc. 
In Zomba Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc.,55 the court tried to 
apply the tests of Gore and Williams to statutory damages in a copyright 
infringement case.56  The defendant, Panorama Records, argued that the statutory 
damages award, which was thirty-seven times more than the actual damages, 
violated the Due Process Clause.57  Although the court knew of no case where the 
Gore test was applied to statutory damages, and refused to apply the Gore factors 
directly, it suggested in dicta that these precedents may apply to statutory 
damages.58 
b. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc. 
A separate set of factors has been promulgated to strictly address statutory 
damages.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc.,59 discussed the enormous 
range of statutory damages that can be awarded for any one work, and 
                                                                                                                                     
53 See Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc. 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that some courts through dicta have suggested that the precedents set in Gore regarding 
punitive damages may apply to statutory-damage awards); see also, STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION 
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 103 (Comm. Print 1961). 
54 Zomba, 491 F.3d at 587 (stating that the Supreme Court of the United States has not 
indicated whether Gore applies to awards of statutory damages). 
55 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). 
56 Id. at 586–88. 
57 Id. at 586. 
58 Id. at 587.  The case involved a music publishing company, Zomba Enterprises, suing 
Panorama Records, a company that manufactures and sells karaoke compact discs, for 
infringement.  Id. at 578–79.  The plaintiffs proved that their copyrights had been infringed and 
elected statutory damages.  Id. at 578.  In response to the defendant’s argument that the awarded 
statutory damages in a ratio of 37:1 was excessive and in violation of due process, the court of 
appeals stated, “[w]e note at the outset that . . . Gore . . . addressed due-process challenges to 
punitive-damages awards.”  Id. at 586.  “The Supreme Court has not indicated whether Gore . . . 
appl[ies] to awards of statutory damages.”  Id. at 587.  It then held that the ratio of statutory 
damages to actual damages was not unacceptable compared to the 113:1 ratio in Williams.  Id. at 
587–88. 
59 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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subsequently found a way to greatly reduce them.60  Most significantly, the court 
in UMG Recordings decided that each CD, rather than each individual sound 
recording, was the proper measuring point for the per infringement calculation of 
damages.61  This favored the defendant because it drastically reduced the amount 
of damages that could have been awarded if considered on a per—song basis.62 
MP3.Com copied thousands of songs from several record companies’ CDs 
and allowed a user of the MP3.Com online system to instantly stream the 
unauthorized copy of the sound recording.63  Although users of the system 
already owned the CDs, the court found that MP3.Com had actual knowledge that 
it was in violation of copyright law.64  The court found MP3.Com willfully 
infringed UMG Recordings copyrighted sound reco 65rdings.  
                                                                                                                                    
The court ignored Gore, and constructed its own test to settle the amount of 
statutory damages to attach to each infringed work.66  In making its 
determination, the court considered: (1) the size and scope of the defendant’s 
infringement in conjunction with the potential for harm; (2) the mitigating actions 
of the defendant between the complaint and the trial; (3) the size and financial 
assets of the defendant; and (4) the deterrence of parties not before the court 
before deciding to assess damages on a per—CD basis.67  Weighing these factors, 
the court concluded that each work allowed for $25,000 in statutory damages for a 
total award of $118 million.68 
c. Reconciling Zomba & UMG  
The decision in UMG Recordings to break the statutory damages down to a 
per—CD, rather than a per—song calculation, is evidence that he believed a per—
song calculation would be too high.  Furthermore, this award was against a for-
profit company, not an individual consumer.  This decision infers that the vast 
range of statutory damages is far too wide. 
The three-factor Gore test applied substantive due process rather than 
procedural due process.69  Under the copyright statutory damages regime, a 
 
60 Id. at 223–25. 
61 Id. at 224–25. 
62 See id. at 224 (the court denied damages based on a per-song basis). 
63 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, No. 00 CIV. 472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). 
64 Id. at *2–4. 
65 Id. at *4. 
66 Id. at *5–6. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *6. 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 36–51. 
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defendant receives notice of the amount of an award of statutory damages because 
of the limits outlined within the statute itself.70  This satisfies the procedural due 
process notice requirement.71  It has been argued; however, that the three-factor 
Gore test should go on to analyze substantive due process, beyond the mere notice 
requirement to determine whether the award is grossly excessive.72 
A second argument is that even though statutory damages are fixed by the 
legislature and known to the defendant, the legislature’s discretion in setting those 
awards must have a limit.73  The legislature’s discretion should be checked by the 
judiciary within the context of an individual case.  Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., a case involving punitive damages in an action for 
false advertising, stated that legislatures have broad discretion “in authorizing and 
limiting permissible punitive damages awards.”74  It further held that when juries 
make awards based within those legislative limits, it is the court’s role to analyze 
the constitutionality of the award under the de novo standard.75 
Finally, on the issue of what is just and fair, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures 
states that the statutes’ limits are what the court “considers just.”76  However, the 
jury must determine what that award will be.77  A jury has properly exercised its 
discretion as long as it has operated to award the damages within the statutory 
limits.78 
As one can assess by the recent case law analyzed above, the punitive effect 
of statutory damages when applied to multiple works at one time can grow to an 
enormously excessive and costly lesson of deterrence.79  Currently, copyright 
statutory damages can create a wide and unpredictable range in amount. 
Although there is a strong case that this would violate the Due Process Clause 
of the Constitution, the courts have not indicated they are willing to move on such 
                                                                                                                                     
70 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). 
71 “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a 
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also the 
severity of the penalty that the State may impose.”  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 
(1996). 
72 John Zenneth Lagrow, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Due Process Protection 
Against Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 157, 194 (1997) (discussion 
of tort reformists failed efforts in Congress to cap punitive damages awards and the Supreme 
Court’s answer that the Due Process Clause should constrain punitive damages). 
73 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001). 
74 Id. at 433. 
75 Id. at 436. 
76 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998). 
77 Id. at 354. 
78 Id. 
79 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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a holding.  The broad range in the amount of damages is not itself a problem 
under the current law.  Therefore copyright remedies are likely to remain where 
they are until Congress addresses the situation. 
III. WRITING—EVOLUTION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PROTECTION 
Since the early 1990s and the introduction of online media distribution 
systems, copyright holders have faced an exponentially expanding problem of 
digital piracy over the Internet.  These media systems have made it easy to 
download and disseminate billions of digital copies of copyrighted sound 
recordings illegally.  This theft has resulted in copyright holders, artists, 
songwriters, musicians and record label employees among others to sustain 
financial losses.80 
The Recording Industry Association of America’s (“RIAA”) first strategy was 
to battle the peer-to-peer file sharing companies and Internet service providers for 
secondary infringement.81  Next, the industry launched an advertising campaign 
hoping that it was just ill-education of the online users that was to blame.82  
Finally, when those did not yield the desired results, they introduced the latest 
highly controversial strategy and began suing the non-commercial individual 
users themselves.83 
A. Contributory Infringement, Vicarious Liability & the Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing Companies 
The RIAA apparently believed that a litigation campaign was the only 
solution to the music industry’s infringement problem.  This new infringement 
problem was a result of new technology; a combination of the Internet and digital 
music files.  The RIAA sought to repair its injury by first suing the peer-to-peer 
file sharing companies, as it was difficult to identify direct individual infringers. 
This campaign did not involve claims for direct infringement, but instead 
claimed contributory infringement and vicarious liability.  Contributory 
                                                                                                                                     
80 An analysis completed by the Institute for Policy Innovation concluded that music 
piracy globally has caused $12.5 billion of economic losses every year, 71,060 U.S. jobs lost, 
a loss of $2.7 billion in workers’ earnings, and a loss of $422 million in tax revenues, $291 
million in personal income tax and $131 million in lost corporate income and production taxes.  
STEVEN E. SIWEK, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING 
PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (2007), http://www.ipi.org/IPI/ IPIPublications.nsf/Publication 
LookupFullTextPDF/51CC65A1D4779E408625733E00529174/$File/SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf?
OpenElement. 
81 Podcast: Intellectual Property Colloquium, Statutory Damages and the Tenenbaum 
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infringement is found when the defendant has knowledge of the directly 
infringing activity and substantially participates in inducing the infringing 
activity.84  Vicarious liability is found if the defendant had the right and ability to 
control the actions of the infringer, and received direct financial benefit from the 
infringement.85 
1. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 
In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,86 the record companies sued Napster, 
an online peer-to-peer network for contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability of the individual users of its system.87  The individual users were the 
direct infringers of the copyrighted works.  The court found the act of 
downloading copyrighted sound recordings on a peer-to-peer network, without a 
license from the copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive 
reproduction right.88  It was held that the act of distributing, or making available, 
for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the 
copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, 
regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown.89  Before Napster had 
the duty to disable access to the offending content, the plaintiff record companies 
had to provide notice to Napster of the copyrighted works, and the files containing 
such works, on Napster’s system.90 
The court held that A & M was likely to succeed on the merits for 
contributory infringement because Napster facilitated the direct infringement of 
its users.91  Napster was also found guilty of vicarious liability because it had the 
ability to control its users’ behavior.92  It turned a blind eye to evidence of the 
infringing actions because of the possible gain of future profits.93  Napster’s 
                                                                                                                                     
84 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373–
76 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
85 Id. at 1375–78. 
86 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
87 Id. at 1011. 
88 Id. at 1013–14. 
89 Id.  This holding was distinguished in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1210, 1217 (D. Minn. 2008).  See infra Part IV.A.3.  In the motion and order for a new trial, the 
court found that when no actual distribution is shown, it does not constitute copyright 
infringement.  Thomas, 579 F. Supp. at 1210.  The jury instruction stating this rule from Napster 
was found erroneous.  Id.  Thomas can be distinguished from Napster by the disputed fact that the 
user actually distributed sound recordings, rather than only post the recordings to a shared folder.  
Id. at 1212.  Further, the central issue of Napster was secondary liability for the creators of the 
Napster file-sharing system and not primary liability as in Thomas.  Id. 
90 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027. 
91 Id. at 1020. 
92 Id. at 1023. 
93 Id. 
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success was directly related to the number of its users, and it did not want to 
alienate potential sources of revenue. 
2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
Plaintiff copyright holders brought actions for contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability against the distributors of a peer-to-peer file sharing network in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.94  Grokster advertised that 
it could do what the Napster system had done and enticed former Napster users to 
download the Grokster software.95  This sealed Grokster’s fate as it was found 
liable for both contributory infringement and vicarious liability under the 
reasoning that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe, shown by clear expression, or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting infringing acts of third parties.96  The court 
also held that the act of downloading copyrighted sound recordings on a peer-to-
peer network, without a license from the copyright owners, violated the owners’ 
exclusive reproduction and distribution rights.97 
3. Digital Rights Management: Fighting Technology with Technology 
The Internet has made it is easy for one to copy and circulate copyrighted 
material quickly and inexpensively.  Conversely, it is difficult and expensive for 
the copyright holder to identify individual infringers, and follow through with 
litigation.  Because of these difficulties, many rights holders have turned to digital 
rights management (“DRM”) to protect their works. 
To counter theft of intangible intellectual property, an analogy has been made 
to tangible property.  DRM is likened to a security system for tangible goods.98  
By employing technological protections rather than, or in addition to, legal 
protections, deterrence by high statutory damages could become obsolete.  These 
‘lock-out’ systems, which physically hinder access to intangible goods on terms 
employed by the copyright holder may be a better answer than litigation based on 
a click-through licensing agreement a consumer may never read.99 
                                                                                                                                     
94 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005). 
95 Id. at 938. 
96 Id. at 930. 
97 Id.; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(finding that the act of making the copyrighted work available on the Internet violated the 
exclusive right of distribution). 
98 Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538 (2005). 
99 Id. at 546. 
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B. The Education of Society 
In addition to the litigation campaign against peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks, the RIAA tried an advertising campaign to educate the general public 
on unlawful music downloading.100  For example, there are warning notices on 
commercially sold CDs and DVDs.  There have been news reports, articles, and 
other media informing the public that the use of an online media distribution 
system to download copyrighted digital media, and distribute it to others 
constitutes copyright infringement.101 
IV. SELECTION OF PERFORMERS—LIABILITY OF THE 
NON-COMMERCIAL USER 
The battle against illegal downloading was not won on the front against the 
ISPs, or the nationwide advertising campaign.  A poll taken at the time of these 
efforts showed that that only thirty percent of the population thought that these 
downloads were illegal.102  After the RIAA targeted non-commercial users, a 
subsequent poll showed that seventy percent of the population thought that 
downloading music in violation of copyright laws was illegal.103  Despite the rise 
in awareness, individual consumers were still downloading and distributing 
billions of copyrighted sound recordings unlawfully. 
Thus, the rights holders turned their attention to the direct infringers: the non-
commercial users.104  The battle against the non-commercial user has been the 
                                                                                                                                     
100 For an example of an anti-piracy advertisement see Posting of NewLine to YouTube, 
TENACIOUS D—Jack Black on Piracy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LkWKvMCzqA& 
feature=related (Oct. 1, 2006).  For an example of the public discrediting the anti-piracy 
advertisement campaign see Posting of awkward pictures to YouTube, Online Piracy PSA Parody, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXR4T8xVFdw&feature=PlayList&p=128BEF08A149D14B
&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=34 (July 20, 2006). 
101 Initial Disclosure Statement for Plaintiff, Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 5269114, at § B5. 
102 Intellectual Property Colloquium, supra at note 81. 
103 Id. 
104 As the Internet improves, both in speed, and graphics, other industries are facing similar 
problems with digital piracy.  The film industry is currently implementing creative solutions for its 
illegal downloading problem.  It has found that increasing amounts of its perpetrators are industry 
insiders.  A.J. Bedel, Lights, Camera, Lawsuit, 2003 DUKE L.& TECH. REV. 31, ¶ 10 (available at  
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0031.html).  The film industry’s litigation 
campaign against industry insiders, rather than individual consumers, is easier.  Id. ¶ 11.  Not only 
because the application of the elements of trade secret law to insiders is simpler, but also because 
the pool of defendants is smaller.  Id. ¶¶ 12–13.  For trade secret law to apply, these industry 
employees must have knowledge that their actions are not allowed by their employer.  See 
generally id.  The average consumer of music is not aware of the copyright laws that govern the 
music downloading, and even when prompted, rarely read the click-through terms of service.  Id. 
¶¶ 13–14.  
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target of much criticism.105  The general population identifies with the non-
commercial consumer defendant in a suit for infringement against a large record 
company. 
There is concern that the recording industry and copyright holders will 
transform these proceedings “into a forum where they can preach the evils of 
peer-to-peer network infringing on a national scale.”106  The record companies 
argue that they must raise the existence of disputes against the consumer to 
demonstrate the harm of downloading and sharing copyrighted sound recordings, 
and that this harm must be established to determine the amount of statutory 
damages they are entitled to receive.107  This approach may tarnish the reputation 
of the record companies, and may have the adverse effect of increasing illegal 
downloads as a method of protest against the record companies.108 
A. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas 
The first case to be tried to a jury on the issue of liability of a direct infringer 
and non-commercial user was Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas.109  Jammie 
Thomas-Rasset, a Minnesota single mother, was charged and originally found 
liable for direct copyright infringement of 24 songs.110 
1. Facts of the Case 
Thomas-Rasset had an account with the online music system, KaZaA.111  
KaZaA is an Internet service that allows its users to download unlimited music 
                                                                                                                                     
105 Mike Madison, A New Low, MADISONIAN.NET, June 18, 2009, http://madisonian.net/2009/ 
06/18/a-new-low/#more-2541. 
106 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Her Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine at 3, 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 
WL 5268238. 
107 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine at 5–6, Thomas, 
579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 2859948. 
108 See Richard Menta, Record Industry Win in Capitol Records v. Thomas a Public Relations 
Problem, MP3NEWSWIRE.NET, June 20, 2009, http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/9002/bad-
pr.html. 
109 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13. 
110 Mike Harvey, Single-mother digital pirate Jammie Thomas-Rasset must pay $80,000 per 
song, TIMES ONLINE, June 19, 2009, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/ 
article6534542.ece. 
111 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13.  KaZaA is a “subscription-based service” connected 
with Brilliant Digital Entertainment (“BDE”).  KaZaA, About KaZaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/ 
about/ about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).  BDE is a “distributor of licensed digital content” 
which includes copyrighted music selections.  Id.  For a monthly subscription fee of fewer than 
twenty dollars, BDE claims one can download unlimited music files and play all of those files on 
up to three personal computers as well as unlimited ring tones to play on a single cell phone.  Id.  
16
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files for a single monthly fee.112  KaZaA was also a semi-decentralized peer-to-
peer network which allowed its subscribers to create sharing folders used to share 
music files with other users.113  When KaZaA was installed on a user’s computer, 
it created the shared folder to store downloaded music files and to allow access to 
those files by other users.114  Users that retrieved the music files from others’ 
shared folders did not pay KaZaA or the copyright holders of the digital 
recordings.115 
On February 21, 2005, the record companies’ investigator, SafeNet, Inc., 
detected individuals engaged in the infringement of its copyrighted sound 
recordings by downloading audio files for free over the Internet and placing these 
files in a shared folder on the KaZaA network.116  SafeNet, Inc. discovered that 
                                                                                                                                     
112 KaZaA, About KaZaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/about/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 
2010).   
113 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine, supra note 107, 
at 5. 
114 Id.  A semi-decentralized peer-to-peer network uses a central index server that contains a 
list of the music files that are available for distribution by the network users.  Id.  Additional 
sharing folders can also be set up and used to distribute files among other users.  Id.  Distributing 
files requires affirmative action by the user.  First, the user must place the file into the folder to be 
distributed.  Id.  When a user wants to locate a file in another users shared folder to download, he 
submits a query to the central index and is directed to where the file is located.  Id. 
115 It is unknown to this author what the KaZaA Terms and Conditions of Use were at the 
time the complaint was filed against Thomas-Rasset.  This was a jury trial and no opinion on the 
merits has been issued.  However, the relevant portions of the Terms and Conditions of Use 
currently state:  
You may use the Materials for personal, noncommercial entertainment use only; 
you are not granted any commercial, sale, resale, reproduction, distribution or 
promotional use rights for the Materials . . .  You may not make any use of the 
Materials that would infringe the copyright therein.  You must comply with all 
applicable law in your use of Materials and agree to protect any third party 
licensor’s rights therein.  You may not make any unauthorized reproduction or 
distribution of Materials that violates applicable law. 
KaZaA, About KazaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/about/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
116 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication of Specific Facts at 
2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 
2007 WL 4586693.  Through discovery, the plaintiff found that Thomas had knowledge of 
Napster and knew that copying and sharing copyrighted music files over the Internet was illegal.  
United States of America’s Memorandum in Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory 
Damages Provision of the Copyright Act, 17. U.S.C. § 504(c) at 14, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 5268235 [hereinafter United States’ Memorandum in Defense]. 
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Thomas-Rasset downloaded, and made available for distribution, multiple 
copyrighted digital works through her shared folder.117 
Charter Communications, in response to a subpoena, identified Thomas-
Rasset as the subscriber responsible for the infringing Internet protocol address.118  
SafeNet found 1,702 digital audio files in Thomas-Rasset’s shared folder.119  A 
sample of twenty-four of these works was chosen by the plaintiffs to assert their 
rights.120  Thomas-Rasset had created a shared file folder, and downloaded music 
files to the shared folder that allowed other users to access the files.121 
The record companies filed a lawsuit against Thomas-Rasset for willful 
reproduction and distribution of the music recordings to constitute a claim for 
copyright infringement.122  They contended that Thomas-Rasset, without consent, 
used the online media system KaZaA to download, and then distribute the 
copyrighted recordings to the public.123  The plaintiffs prayed for statutory 
damages, instead of actual damages and profits, for each of the twenty-four 
copyrighted recordings pursuant to Section 504 of the Copyright Act.124  They 
also asked for injunctive relief.125 
2. Jury Verdict: Trial 1 
The jury was instructed on the elements of the plaintiff’s claim for copyright 
infringement: (1) whether the plaintiff’s were owners of the copyrighted works, 
and (2) whether the defendant infringed one or more of the works.126  The jury 
was also instructed on the meaning of “willful” in the context of copyright 
                                                                                                                                     
117 Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 4, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-
1497), 2006 WL 1431921. 
118 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication of Specific Facts, 
supra note 116, at 2.  Thomas-Rasset was chosen from 20,000 other individuals that were flagged 
by SafeNet.  Kristen Nicole, RIAA’s Sacrificial Lamb Brought to Trial, MASHABLE: THE SOCIAL 
MEDIA GUIDE, Oct. 2, 2007, http://mashable.com/2007/10/02/riaa-capitol-records-v-jammie-
thomas/ (explaining Thomas was contacted via instant messenger before she received an official 
letter sent through her ISP, Charter Communications). 
119 Nicole, supra note 118. 
120 Id. 
121 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine, supra note 107, 
at 6.   
122 Complaint for Copyright Infringement, supra note 117, at 4–5. 
123 Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions at 3, Capitol Records, Inc v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 
2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL 1683922. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Stipulated Jury Instructions at 19, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 
WL 2859934. 
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infringement.127  If infringement was found, the jury had to decide the amount of 
statutory damages based on whether they determined infringement was willful or 
non-willful.128 
The jury found that the plaintiffs owned the works.129  The jury also found 
that the defendant willfully infringed the twenty-four song recordings.130  This 
amounted to statutory damages for each song of $9,250, for a total damage award 
of $222,000.131 
3. New Trial 
Thomas-Rasset promptly filed a motion for a new trial.132  Based primarily on 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore133 and State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,134 she argued that the statutory damages award was 
excessive, and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States 
                                                                                                                                     
127 Id. at 20 (“‘Willful’ means that a defendant had knowledge that his or actions constituted 
copyright infringement.”).  If it is found that the defendant infringed a copyright willfully, the 
range of statutory damages is escalated to a maximum of $150,000 per infringed work.  General 
Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976).  For a decision of 
infringement, the jury had to find that either Thomas-Rasset downloaded the recordings or made 
the recordings available for electronic distribution using a peer-to-peer network without a license 
from the copyright owner (violating the exclusive right of reproduction and the exclusive right of 
distribution).  Stipulated Jury Instructions, supra note 126, at 19. 
128 Special Verdict Form at 2–8, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 
2957532. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur at 1, Thomas, 579 
F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 4586690. 
133 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
134 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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Constitution.135  Her ultimate argument was that the legislatively-fixed sanction 
under the copyright statutory damages regime was unconstitutional.136 
Thomas-Rasset argued that the damages award was greater than 1,000 times 
the actual damages that were suffered by the plaintiffs.137  She likened the 
copyright statutory damages regime to the punitive damages regime because of its 
similar intent to deter.138  Although the stream of cases Thomas-Rasset cited 
discussed the issue of punitive damages, and not statutory damages, she called on 
the court to use its discretion to lower the damages because they were grossly 
excessive.139 
In response, the plaintiff record companies argued that Thomas-Rasset 
inappropriately applied the test for excessive punitive damages to an award for 
statutory damages.140  The plaintiffs stated that this test was improper because this 
case was within the carefully circumscribed category to which copyright statutory 
                                                                                                                                     
135 Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at 
1–2.  Interestingly, after her motion was filed, the United States moved to intervene and defend 
the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).  United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 
116, at 1.  It stated that Thomas applied the wrong standard when scrutinizing statutory damages.  
Id. at 7.  Instead of applying Gore, Thomas-Rasset had to apply the standard set forth in St. Louis, 
I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams which is a less demanding standard applicable to punitive damages 
and more deferential.  Id. at 7–8; St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).  
For a statutory damages award to fail the test in St. Louis, it must be “so severe and oppressive as 
to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.”  251 U.S. at 67.  The year 
the case was decided, 1919, raises the question of whether this precedent aligns with the purpose 
of the new amendments to the Copyright Act, made in 1999. 
136 Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at 
9–12. 
137 Id. at 1 n.1 (“[A]ttesting that popular music sound recording downloads and consumer 
license[s] to use the same are lawfully obtainable to the public at 99 cents per song, and of the 99 
cents, roughly 70 cents per song is paid by the retailer to the record label.”). 
138 Id. at 6.  According to the House Report, the 1999 amendments made to Section 504(c) of 
the Copyright Act, which increased the ranges of damages, stated “juries must be able to render 
awards that deter others from infringing intellectual property rights.”  H.R. Rep. No. 106-216 
(1999).  Also, in The United States’ Memorandum in Defense, the government stated that a 
remedy is not to be construed as a form of punitive damages just because it is meant to deter, and 
that that “defendant mistakenly conflate[d] the deterrence element that exists in the statutory 
damages context with punitive damages.”  United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 
116, at 10. 
139 Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at 
12.  The main cases that were cited by Thomas-Rasset included BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559 (1996), State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), and Zomba Enters. 
v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). 
140 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the 
Alternative for Remittitur at 2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D.Minn. 
2008) (No. 06-cv-1497),  2007 WL 4586692. 
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damages apply.141  Further, they stated that Thomas-Rasset was notified about the 
damages range, and did not object to that range prior to the verdict.142  Thomas-
Rasset’s attempt to reduce the award was contrary to Congress’ carefully crafted 
regime of statutory damages,143 which may be awarded even in the absence of 
proof of actual damages.144 
In defense of the high statutory damages award, the record companies pointed 
to the fact that Thomas-Rasset made the infringed recordings available to 
potentially millions of other KaZaA users.145  Although there was no evidence as 
to how many users downloaded the songs from Thomas-Rasset’s shared folder, 
the record companies stated that they had suffered substantial harm by the general 
distribution of their copyrighted recordings over the Internet.146  The plaintiffs 
minimized the award of $222,000 by comparing it to the amount the jury was 
authorized to award.147  It was concluded that $222,000 was only ten percent of 
what the award could have been.148  The plaintiffs then emphasized the legislative 
history of Section 504 of the Copyright Act and its intent to deter.149 
                                                                                                                                     
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1–2.  This was also the argument in the United State’s memorandum on the issue of 
notice.  United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116 at 10–11.   
143 The Congressional Record outlines the intent of the statutory damages regime.  
Congressman Coble from North Carolina stated during debates that the amendment “makes 
significant improvements in the ability of the Copyright Act to deter copyright infringement by 
amending it to increase the statutory penalties for infringement.”  145 CONG. REC. H12884-01 
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Cong. Coble).  “Copyright piracy . . . is flourishing in the 
world.  With the advanced technologies available and the fact that many computer users are either 
ignorant of the copyright laws or simply believe that they will not be caught or punished, the 
piracy trend will continue.”  Id. 
144 United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116, at 16.  When actual damages are 
difficult to ascertain, statutory damages compensate those wronged by ensuring that those who 
have wronged them are deterred.  Id. 
145 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or in the 
Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 140, at 2.  
146 Id.  The United States argued that because of the incalculable harms due to the potential 
millions of users over the Internet who had infringed copyrighted music, the high and broad range 
of statutory damages was justified.  United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116, at 
16.   
147 Because the jury found that Thomas-Rasset committed infringement willfully, the 
maximum the jury could have found for each infringing work is $150,000.  17. U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) 
(2006).  The jury could have found statutory damages in the amount of $3,600,000. 
148 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or in the 
Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 140, at 3.  
149 Id. at 9–10; see also KaZaA, supra note 112.  To elaborate on the legislative and executive 
intent behind the “Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damage Improvement Act of 1999” 
which amended Section 504 of the Copyright Act, upon signing the bill, President Clinton stated 
“[t]hat this legislation will increase for the first time since 1988 the statutory damages that a 
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Abiding by constitutional avoidance, the District Court of Minnesota asked 
the parties to brief the “making available” issue.150  Jury Instruction No. 15 stated 
that “[t]he act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic 
distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright owners, 
violates the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of 
whether actual distribution has been shown.”151  Thomas-Rasset argued that the 
court committed an error of law when it instructed the jury that the act of making 
copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-
peer network, without permission from the rights holder, violates the owner’s 
exclusive right of distribution, even if no actual distribution had been shown.152 
The judge decided that Jury Instruction No. 15 was erroneous and issued a 
new trial.153  In the memorandum and order for a new trial the judge expressed: 
The court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to 
amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-
to-peer network cases such as the one currently before this Court . . 
. the total damages awarded is $222,000, more than five hundred 
times the cost the buying 24 separate CDs . . .154 
4. Jury Verdict: Trial 2 
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found that (1) each plaintiff 
respectfully owned the copyrights in each work; (2) Thomas-Rasset155 committed 
an act of infringement with respect to each of the works; and (3) Thomas-Rasset 
infringed each work willfully.156  As a result, the jury found Thomas-Rasset liable 
                                                                                                                                     
copyright holder may recover for certain copyright infringements.  This increase in penalties 
should be an effective deterrent to would-be pirates of copyrighted works.”  President’s Message 
to Congress on Digital Theft Deterrence Act, 1999 WL 1128961 (White House, Dec. 9, 1999). 
150 Defendant’s Second Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Motion for New Trial at 3–4, 
Capital Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2008 
WL 4660356. 
151 Id. (emphasis added).   
152 Defendant’s Second Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Motion for New Trial at 5–7, 
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2008 WL 4660356.  Thomas-Rasset cited 
binding Eighth Circuit precedent in the case of National Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. Computer 
Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993).  National Car Rental held that 
“infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination . . . .”  Id. at 434 (quoting 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A] (2009)). 
153 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. 
154 Id. at 1227 (emphasis original). 
155 Jammie Thomas had changed her name to Jammie Thomas-Rasset by the time the second 
trial had commenced. 
156 Special Verdict Form at 9–13, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL 
1717117. 
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for $1.9 million, at $80,000 per work.157  Although well within the statutory 
limits, this award, which is highly disproportionate to the actual damages, raises 
the constitutional questions discussed above.158 
5. Remittitur 
Again, Thomas-Rasset filed a Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter 
or Amend the Judgment because of the high amount of the statutory damages 
awarded.159  She placed three arguments before the court: (1) the statutory 
damages provision of the Copyright Act violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution, therefore plaintiffs are entitled to nothing in damages; (2) the jury 
award of statutory damages was excessive and shocking, therefore plaintiffs are 
entitled to the minimum statutory amount of $750 per infringement; or (3) the 
amount of damages were so excessive and shocking as to warrant a new trial.160  
In turn, the record companies filed a Motion to Amend Judgment to include a 
permanent injunction against Thomas-Rasset.161 
The District Court of Minnesota chose Thomas-Rasset’s second argument, but 
did not remit the award to the minimum statutory amount of $750 per violation.162  
It followed the “maximum recovery rule”163 and decided to reduce Thomas-
Rasset’s damages to three times the statutory minimum.164  She was assessed a 
damage amount of $2,250 for each of the 24 songs infringed, for a total amount of 
$54,000.165  Judge Davis stated: 
This award constitutes the maximum amount a jury could 
reasonably award to both compensate Plaintiffs and address the 
deterrence aspect of the Copyright Act.  This reduced award is 
significant and harsh. . . .  It was the jury’s province to determine 
the award of statutory damages and this Court has merely reduced 
                                                                                                                                     
157 Id. at 17–20. 
158 See Menta, supra note 108 (discussion of Thomas-Rasset’s expert witness who testified 
that actual damages were estimated at about 99 cents per infringement). 
159 See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (D. Minn. 2010). 
160 Id. at 1050. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 1055. 
163 Id. at 1054 (citing Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 
2004); see Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 556 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding remittitur to 
“the maximum amounts that would be sustained by [plaintiff’s] proof” is the proper standard) 
(footnote omitted). 
164 Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1056–57. 
165 Id.  
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that award to the maximum amount that is no longer monstrous 
and shocking.166 
The court discussed that Congress set the statutory minimum at $750 for non-
willful infringement, and that evidence clearly showed that Thomas-Rasset 
willfully infringed the works and then lied on the witness stand trying to blame 
others, including her children, for her actions.167  Again, abiding by constitutional 
avoidance, the court did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the 
jury’s damages award.168 
The court also granted the record companies’ motion for a permanent 
injunction against Thomas-Rasset.169  It discussed the three-part test to determine 
whether a permanent injunction is warranted: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to 
the plaintiff; (2) the balance of the harm to the plaintiff as compared to the harm 
suffered by the defendant if the injunction was granted; and (3) the public 
interest.170  The threat of harm to the record companies was apparent, as there was 
a likelihood of future infringement by Thomas-Rasset because she had not 
accepted responsibility for her actions.171  The second factor was met, as Thomas-
Rasset could not realize harm by being enjoined from doing something that was 
illegal.172  Finally, the third factor was against Thomas-Rasset because the general 
policy behind the Copyright Act is that the public interest is in favor of upholding 
copyright protections and the copyright holders’ exclusivity.173 
Although Thomas-Rasset’s damages were reduced as excessive and shocking, 
the issue of whether the copyright statutory damages regime is unconstitutional 
when applied to a non-commercial user has yet to be addressed by the courts. 
B. Current Case Law & the Constitutional Issue of Due Process 
Although other individual consumer defendants have been served for online 
infringement of sound recordings, Thomas-Rasset stands alone as the only one to 
go to a jury.174  Thomas-Rasset’s counsel tried to analogize the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                     
166 Id. at 1049 (emphasis original). 
167 Id. at 1053. 
168 Id. at 1057. 
169 Id. at 1061. 
170 Id. at 1059 (quoting Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 967 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 1060. 
173 Id. at 1061. 
174 Another case currently similarly situated is Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, 626 F. Supp. 
2d 152 (D. Mass. 2009).  In this case defendants argued that statutory damages under the 
Copyright Act were so excessive that it converted the litigation into a criminal proceeding and 
violated their due process rights.  Id. at 153–54.  The defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied 
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issue of due process in punitive damages cases to those of statutory damages.175  
This issue received attention in the Judge’s order for a new trial.176  The burning 
questions are whether the amount of the award is “grossly excessive” to align 
with the holding in Gore, and whether the jury may award statutory damages 
based on intent to deter those not before the court in accordance with Williams.177 
To consider whether Thomas-Rasset’s statutory damages in the amount of 
$1.9 million are “grossly excessive” under the standard of Gore we must apply 
the three-part test set forth by the Supreme Court: the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct; the disparity between the harm actually suffered and the 
punitive damages award; and the difference between the remedy in the specific 
case and the remedies imposed in comparable cases.178 
First, there is an argument that Thomas-Rasset met the first factor to some 
degree.  She intentionally uploaded over 1,700 sound recordings by various 
artists.179  She admitted in her deposition that she was familiar with the decision 
of A & M Records v. Napster,180 and was therefore minimally aware of illegal 
downloading.181  There is also the issue of replacing her hard drive after she 
received notice that a complaint was to be issued against her.182  Hence, there was 
evidence that her conduct was far from innocent. 
Second, there was disparity between the harm actually suffered and the 
statutory damages.183  There was evidence to show a ratio of actual to statutory 
damages that was greater than 1 to 1,000.184  To apply Gore by analogy, the ratio 
of actual damages to punitive damages in Gore was 1 to 500.185  As the Gore 
court found that a ratio of 1 to 500 weighed heavily on this factor, the court in 
Thomas-Rasset could easily have done the same. 
                                                                                                                                     
because the court decided that in the due process challenge to statutory damages, the Copyright 
Act does not represent unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial function, and that alleged non-
commercial use is not excluded from statutory damages.  Id. at 154–55; see also Sony BMG 
Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009) (summary judgment for 
plaintiff in fair use doctrine in file sharing case). 
175 Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the Judgment at 4–8, Thomas-
Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL 4922073. 
176 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
177 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559–60 (1996). 
178 Id. at 574. 
179 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
180 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
181 Id. at 1023–24. 
182 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 912, 930 (2005). 
183 Gore considered punitive damages, therefore, the true inquiry is the disparity the actual 
harm and the amount of punitive damages.  517 U.S. at 559. 
184 See supra Part IV.A.3; Menta, supra note 108. 
185 See supra Part II.B; Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. 
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Third, is whether the award in the Thomas-Rasset case is similar to awards in 
other cases similarly situated.186  Currently, Thomas-Rasset is the only case that 
has actually gone to a trial by jury.  Many of the cases in the litigation campaign 
by the record companies against non-commercial users have settled out of court.  
The negotiations and settlements in these discussions are of course undisclosed, 
but it is fair to infer that these defendants are not settling in the millions.  
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess Thomas-Rasset’s damage award compared to 
related cases. 
If we compare Thomas to those cases dealing with punitive damages 
previously discussed, as her counsel did, it can be argued that these cases are both 
similar and dissimilar.  They are analogous in that each involved damages which 
seemed unconscionably high compared to the actual damages.  But one point that 
opposing counsel, the government, and the courts make is that punitive damages 
are not statutory damages.187  The plaintiffs argued that due process is met 
because there is notice for statutory damages in the amount proscribed by 
Congress.188  Further, the intent to deter through extremely liberal ranges is 
justified, and clearly within the legislature’s goal based on the history of the 1999 
amendments to the Copyright Act.189 
Assuming arguendo that we can apply the elements of Gore to statutory 
damages, it is not absolutely clear that Thomas would pass.  According to the 
evidence presented, Thomas-Rasset had knowledge of the Napster holding and 
replaced the incriminating hard drive pending litigation.190  This would meet the 
first Gore factor of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.191 
On the other hand, if there was a defendant in a situation akin to Thomas-
Rasset’s without such incriminating evidence, a decision could be closer to the 
actual holding in Gore and go the other way when applying the these factors.192  
Even if a defendant is found guilty of willful infringement, a jury can always find 
a lesser amount of statutory damages.  The first Thomas trial returned a verdict 
much lower than the second, yet it still seems too high for an individual non-
commercial entity.193 
                                                                                                                                     
186 Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. 
187 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
188 See supra Part IV.A.3; Complaint for Copyright Infringement, supra note 117. 
189 See supra Part II.A. 
190 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
191 Gore, 517 U.S. at 574. 
192 Gore held that the award of $2 million dollars in punitive damages was grossly excessive 
in light of the low level of reprehensibility.  Id. at 575–76. 
193 See supra Part.IV.A.2. 
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As we have seen, this issue is not as clear as some advocates and recent 
articles suggest.  At first glance the interests of the multi-million dollar 
entertainment industry, pitted against the individual consumer are unbalanced, 
unfair and uneven in bargaining power.  But when children are more 
knowledgeable about the Internet and illegal downloading than their parents, 
maybe it is only a matter of a generation.  Lack of knowledge is not a defense to 
illegal downloading.194  Certainly after the Thomas case, this issue will be more 
widely discussed. 
V.  MASTERING—CONCLUSION 
The Copyright Act’s statutory damages regime is constitutional and has been 
in place since the dawn of the Constitution itself.  The United States, in defense of 
the statutory regime, has argued that the high damage awards that were increased 
in 1999 are exactly what Congress intended to deter non-commercial users.195  
Individuals are infringing and do not take the copyright laws as seriously as they 
should.196 
The current strategy, however, of the record companies to combat the 
infringement of sound recordings online, allows the jury awards to be 
astronomical and unreasonable.  Nevertheless, even if the statutory damages 
awards are astronomical, the copyright holders are entitled to them; they are 
allowed under the current statutory regime.  Therefore, changes should be made to 
the copyright statutory damages provision.  The provision cannot disappear; 
statutory damages are well placed to deter and recoup actual damages when those 
damages are difficult to prove.  But as the law now stands, both plaintiffs and 
defendants are suffering.  The high range of damages, up to and including 
$150,000 per work, a work what costs 99 cents to download to an Apple iPod, 
held against a consumer whose objective is not profit, borders on ridiculous.  It 
ruins the non-commercial users’ finances and may force them into bankruptcy 




194 See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 197 (Tex. App. 2010) (a Texas 
teenager could not use an innocent infringement defense for copyright infringement because a 
proper copyright notice appeared on the published sound recordings to which she had access). 
195 United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116, at 16 (“Most recently, Congress 
has crafted a statute as a deterrent to those infringing parties who think they will go undetected in 
committing this great public wrong, as well as providing compensation to copyright owners who 
have to invest resources into protecting property that is often unquantifiable.”). 
196 See Tenacious-D, supra note 100. 
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